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Abstract
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for dou-
ble auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior
information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee’s mechanism handles single-
parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single unit and each buyer to buy
a single unit. This paper presents a double-auction mechanism that handles multi-
parametric agents and allows multiple units per trader, as long as the valuation
functions of all traders have decreasing marginal returns. The mechanism is prior-
free, ex-post individually-rational, dominant-strategy truthful and strongly-budget-
balanced. Its gain-from-trade approaches the optimum when the market size is suf-
ficiently large.
1 Introduction
In a two-sided market, there are several sellers who hold items for sale and several buy-
ers who consider buying these items. Examples are stock exchanges, used-car markets,
emission trading markets (Godby, 1999; Sturm, 2008), Internet advertisements (Feld-
man and Gonen, 2016) and markets for spectrum reallocation (Leyton-Brown et al.,
2017). Each trader has a different valuation to each bundle of items. In contrast to a
one-sided market, here the valuations of both the buyers and the sellers are their private
information, and both sides might act strategically. A double auction is a mechanism
for organizing a two-sided market — deciding who will buy, who will sell and at what
prices.
An important requirement from a double-auction is efficiency, which is measured
by its gain-from-trade (GFT) — the total value gained by the buyers minus the total
value contributed by the sellers. As an example, in a used-car market with a single
buyer and a single seller holding a single car, if the seller values the car as vs and the
buyer as vb > vs, then the potential GFT is vb − vs.
The most commonly used double-auction mechanism is the Walrasian mechanism
(Babaioff et al., 2014; Rustichini et al., 1994). It computes an equilibrium price — a
price at which the supply equals the demand: the total number of units that sellers are
interested to sell at this price equals the total number of units that buyers are interested
to buy at this price. In a single-good market, an equilibrium price exists whenever the
agents have decreasing-marginal-returns (DMR) — the marginal utility for an agent
from having one more unit is weakly-decreasing in his current number of units (Gul and
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Stacchetti, 2000). Moreover, by the First Welfare Theorem, this mechanism attains the
maximum GFT (Nisan et al., 2007, Theorem 11.13). Unfortunately, this mechanism is
not incentive-compatible (IC) — agents have an incentive to misreport their valuations
in order to manipulate the price.
The problem of designing an IC double-auction has already been considered by
Vickrey. In his seminal paper (Vickrey, 1961) he described a variant of his famous
second-price auction for a two-sided market. Like its one-sided variant, it is dominant-
strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC, aka truthful) — it is a weakly-dominant strategy
for each agent to reveal its true valuation function. But unlike the one-sided variant it
is not budget-balanced (BB) — it has a deficit — it requires the market-maker to bring
money from home. While it is possible to charge entrance-fees to cover this cost, this
makes the mechanism not individually rational (IR) — some traders might lose from
participating.
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) proved that, in a two-sided market, any mech-
anism that is IR, BB and IC cannot be efficient . Intuitively, the reason is that it is
impossible to truthfully determine prices for trading. Consider any mechanism that
charges the buyer pb and pays the seller ps. If ps < vb, then the seller is incentivized
to bid (ps + vb)/2 to force the price up (the mechanism has to do the deal since it is
still efficient). Similarly, if pb > vs, the buyer is incentivized to force the price down.
Setting ps = vb and pb = vs leads to a deficit. One way out is to determine take-it-or-
leave-it prices independently of the traders’ valuations, but this might result in a total
loss of GFT.
This impossibility result initiated a search for double-auction mechanisms that are
IC, IR and BB, and attain an approximately maximal GFT. We define the competitive
ratio of a mechanism as the minimum ratio (over all utility profiles) of its GFT divided
by the optimal GFT. The first approximation mechanism was presented by McAfee
McAfee (1992) for the case when each seller has a single unit and each buyer wants
a single unit. McAfee’s mechanism is truthful — it is a weakly-dominant strategy for
each agent to report his true valuation for the item. Its competitive-ratio is 1 − 1/k,
where k is the number of units traded in the optimal situation. (i.e, its GFT is always
at least 1− 1/k of the maximum GFT). Thus, McAfee’s mechanism is asymptotically
efficient — when the market-size k grows to infinity, the GFT approaches the max-
imum. In addition to being truthful, IR, BB and asymptotically-efficient, McAfee’s
mechanism has a fifth nice property — it is prior-free (PF). This means that it does not
require any statistical information about the traders’ valuations; it works well even for
worst-case (adversarial) valuations.
The main drawback of McAfee’s mechanism is that it works only for single-unit
traders. Another potential drawback is that it is only weakly-budget-balanced (WBB)
— the market-maker need not bring money, but may the have to take money. Moreover,
in some cases the market-maker consumes almost all the GFT, leaving only little GFT
to the traders (Segal-Halevi et al., 2016b). This may be acceptable when the market-
maker is a monopolist (e.g. a government), but might be problematic when the market-
maker faces competition, e.g. in stock exchange platforms, since a low GFT for the
traders might drive them away to the competitors. 1
This paper presents MUDA — a double-auction mechanism for traders that buy and
1Technically it is possible to convert a WBB mechanism to a SBB one: randomly pick an agent before
the trade, disallow him to participate in the trade, and give him all the surplus after the trade. However, this
might induce a lot of people without any interest in the trade (e.g, “sellers” with no goods or “buyers” with
no money) to participate in the auction, in the hope of winning the lottery. We believe this goes against the
idea of truthfulness, and might have adverse effects on the market.
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sell multiple units. The only assumption required is that all traders have decreasing-
marginal-returns; this is the same assumption that guarantees the existence of market-
equilibrium.
The main idea of MUDA is to calculate equilibrium prices using random halving.
The general scheme is presented below; it is explained in more detail in Section 3.
MUDA (general scheme): Split the market to two sub-markets, left and right, by
sending each trader to each side with probability 1/2, independently of the others.
Then, in each sub-market:
1. Calculate a market-equilibrium price (pR at the right, pL at the left).
2. Let the agents trade at the price from the other market (pL at the right, pR
at the left).
The random-sampling technique was found useful in one-sided markets (Balcan
et al., 2008, 2007; Devanur et al., 2015; Goldberg et al., 2006, 2001) and match-
ing markets (Devanur and Hayes, 2009). However, applying it to a two-sided mar-
ket poses a new challenge: material balance — the number of units bought and sold
must be exactly equal. This is in contrast to a one-sided market, where the seller may
leave some units unsold. Random-sampling in two-sided markets was used only with
one-parametric agents — agents whose valuations are characterized by a single signal
Baliga and Vohra (2003); Kojima and Yamashita (2014).
With random-sampling, the price at each sub-market is determined exogenously
based on the other sub-market, so the agents cannot manipulate it by reporting strategi-
cally. However, because of the material-balance requirement, the traders have another
reason to report strategically — they might try to manipulate the quantity of trade.
Thus, the multi-unit two-sided setting is more difficult than both the single-unit two-
sided setting of McAfee and the multi-unit one-sided setting common in the random-
sampling literature. To illustrate this added difficulty, we prove:
Theorem 1. Suppose a single seller holdsM units of a good and a single buyer consid-
ers buying at mostM units of this good and the price per unit of the good is determined
exogenously. Then, the expected competitive ratio of every DSIC and IR mechanism,
whether deterministic or randomized, is:
• at most 1/M for agents with general valuations, and —
• at most 1/HM for agents with DMR valuations, whereHM is theM -th harmonic
number (HM ≈ lnM + 1M ).
Both these upper bounds are tight.
The proof is given in Segal-Halevi and Hassidim (2017). Theorem 1 can be seen as
a dual to the Myerson–Satterthwaite impossibility theorem. In their setting, the quantity
is determined exogenously and the traders might manipulate the price; in our setting,
the price is determined exogenously and the traders might manipulate the quantity.
We present two variants of MUDA that overcome this impossibility when the mar-
ket is sufficiently large. We call them Lottery-MUDA and Vickrey-MUDA.
Step 1 is the same in both variants. Step 2 in both variants starts by calculating the
aggregate demand and aggregate supply in each sub-market, at the prices calculated
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in the other sub-market. Usually, the aggregate demand will be larger or smaller than
the aggregate supply, so the sub-market will have a long side and a short side (e.g,
if there is more demand than supply then the buyers are the long side and the sellers
are the short side). The short side can always trade their optimum quantity; i.e, if the
buyers are short, we can let each buyer buy the number of units that maximizes his
utility given the price. The two variants of MUDA differ in the way they handle the
long side: in Lottery-MUDA the traders in the long side are selected using a random
permutation that ignores their values, while in Vickrey-MUDA the high-value traders
in the long side are selected. In Vickrey-MUDA, each selected trader pays the market-
maker a positive trading-fee calculated as in a Vickrey auction; this fee is separate from
the money transferred among the traders (the inspiration to this idea came from a recent
working paper by Loertscher and Mezzetti (2016)).
Theorem 2. Both variants of MUDA are prior-free, dominant-strategy incentive-compatible,
individually-rational and budget-balanced (no deficit). In addition, Lottery-MUDA is
strongly-budget-balanced (no surplus).
Proof. Prior-freeness holds by design: MUDA does not use any statistical information
on the valuations.
DSIC and IR will be proved in Section 4 after presenting the mechanism details.
Lottery-MUDA is strongly-budget-balanced (SBB) since all money goes from buy-
ers to sellers; the market-maker neither brings nor takes any money. Vickrey-MUDA
is only weakly budget-balanced (WBB) — the market-maker does not lose money, but
may make profit from trading-fees.
We emphasize that the properties are true ex-post — for every outcome of the ran-
domization in the mechanism.
We distinguish between the total-GFT, which includes the gain of both the agents
and the market-maker, and the agents-GFT, which includes only the gain of the agents.
Since Lottery-MUDA is SBB, the agents-GFT equals the total-GFT. In Vickrey-MUDA,
the total-GFT is always higher since the most profitable deals are selected. However,
the agents-GFT might be much lower. In a particular example shown in the arXiv
version, the total-GFT is high but the agents-GFT is near 0. Thus, Vickrey-MUDA
may be preferred when the market-maker is a monopolist (e.g, a government), while
Lottery-MUDA may be preferred when the market-maker faces competition (e.g, a
stock-exchange).
The competitive-ratio of MUDA depends on k — the number of units traded in the
optimal situation (the k used by McAfee 1992), and M — the maximum number of
units offered(demanded) by a single seller(buyer). M represents the market concentra-
tion — how much market power is held by a single trader.
Theorem 3. The expected total-GFT of both Lottery-MUDA and Vickrey-MUDA is
at least a fraction 1−O(M
√
ln k
k ) of the maximum total-GFT.
The proof is given in Section 5.
While Vickrey-MUDA attains more total-GFT than Lottery-MUDA, their asymp-
totic behavior is similar — both of them approach the optimal total-GFT when the
market size (k) is large, as long as the market-concentration factor (represented by M )
is kept constant. In contrast, if M is very large (M = k) the market effectively has a
single buyer and a single seller, and the impossibility result of (Myerson and Satterth-
waite, 1983) implies that no positive approximation of the GFT is possible. The arXiv
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version shows an example in which the agents-GFT of Vickrey-MUDA is close to 0
(the agents-GFT of Lottery-MUDA always equals its total-GFT).
While we focus on approximating the maximum GFT (buyers’ values minus trad-
ing sellers’ values), other mechanisms in the literature approximate the maximum so-
cial welfare (buyers’ values plus non-trading sellers’ values). But any mechanism that
attains a fraction α of the optimal GFT also attains a fraction of at least α of the opti-
mal social welfare (Brustle et al., 2017). Hence, MUDA is asymptotically-optimal with
respect to the social-welfare too.
The lower bound of Theorem 3 depends on k — the optimal trade size. Ideally,
we would like a bound that depends on the number of traders that come to the market
(say, n). However, we cannot attain such bound theoretically in a worst-case analysis,
even for the social-welfare. As an example, consider a single-good single-unit market
having n sellers with value 2, n − 1 buyers with value 1 and one buyer with value
1000000. Here k = 1 as there is only one relevant trade. The competitive ratio of any
mechanism depends only on the probability with which it performs this single trade;
this probability does not change even when n→∞.
We complement our worst-case analysis that depends on k with simulations of
both variants of MUDA on agents drawn from both synthetic and realistic distribu-
tions. The simulations show that, when valuations are random (and not worst-case), the
competitive-ratio of MUDA increases with the number of traders. These are presented
in Section 6.
1.1 Related Work
Most existing mechanisms for multi-unit double-auction are not truthful, e.g. Plott and
Gray (1990).
The research on truthful double auction has made many advancements since McAfee
(1992). There are variants of McAfee’s mechanism for maximizing the auctioneer’s
surplus (Deshmukh et al., 2002), handling spatially-distributed markets (Babaioff et al.,
2004), transaction costs (Chu and Shen, 2006), supply chains (Babaioff and Walsh,
2006), constraints on the set of traders that can trade simultaneously (Brustle et al.,
2017; Du¨tting et al., 2017; Yao et al., 2011), online arrival of buyers (Wang et al., 2010)
and strong budget-balance (Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2016). All these advancements are
for single-unit agents.
Other double-auction mechanisms either assume that the agents’ valuations are ad-
ditive (Feldman and Gonen, 2016; Goel et al., 2016; Hirai and Sato, 2017; Huang et al.,
2002; Xu et al., 2010) or assume that their valuations are represented by a single param-
eter Gonen et al. (2007); Kojima and Yamashita (2014). The DMR valuations handled
by MUDA are multi-parametric and include additive valuations as a special case.
Several recent double-auction mechanisms work in a Bayesian setting — they as-
sume that the traders’ valuations are drawn from some probability distribution that is
public knowledge. Such knowledge allows the mechanism designer to attain approxi-
mate efficiency without relying on the agents’ reports. Examples are Colini-Baldeschi
et al. (2017); Yoon (2008). Some other mechanisms require partial prior knowledge on
the valuations, such as their median (Blumrosen and Dobzinski, 2014) or their max-
imum and minimum value Gonen and Egri (2017). (Baliga and Vohra, 2003) assume
that the agents’ valuations are drawn from some unknown distribution (they handle
single-unit traders) . In contrast, MUDA needs no prior information on the agents’
valuations and does not even assume that they are drawn from some distribution.
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We are aware of two truthful mechanisms that handle multi-parametric agents with
DMR valuations in a prior-free way. The first is by Blumrosen and Dobzinski (2014):
their competitive ratio is 1/48 — it is not asymptotically-efficient. The second is by
Loertscher and Mezzetti (2016), which is being developed simultaneously to our work.
Their mechanism (that does not use market-halving) is asymptotically-efficient when
the valuations of the traders are drawn from probability distributions satisfying certain
conditions. In contrast, our convergence theorem does not assume that agents’ valua-
tions are drawn from a distribution at all.
2 Model
Agents and valuations We consider a market for a single good. Some agents, the
“sellers”, are endowed with at most M units of that good, and other agents, the “buy-
ers”, are endowed with an unlimited supply of money. Each agent j has a valuation-
function vj that returns, for every integer t between 0 and M , the agent’s value for
owning t units. The valuations are normalized such that vi(0) = 0.
All agents have decreasing marginal returns (DMR). Formally, vj(t+1)−vj(t) ≤
vj(t)− vj(t− 1), for every agent j and t ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1}.
We will often represent a multi-unit agent asM single-unit virtual agents; the value
of virtual-agent t of agent j is the agent’s marginal value for having the t-th unit:
vj,t := vj(t)− vj(t− 1) for t ∈ {1, . . . ,M} (a similar idea was used by Chawla et al.
(2010)).
We assume that the agents’ valuations are generic, i.e, all marginal values of differ-
ent traders are different and linearly-independent over the integers (no linear combina-
tion with integer coefficients equals zero). This assumption can be dropped if we use
centralized tie-breaking; see Hsu et al. (2016) for other ways to handle ties in markets.
Given a price p per unit of the good, the gain of a buyer i from buying t units is
Gaini(t, p) = vi(t)−t·p, and the gain of a seller j from selling t units isGainj(t, p) =
t · p+ vj(Mj − t)− vj(Mj), where Mj is the number of units initially held by seller
j, Mj ≤M .
A mechanism is a (randomized) function that takes the agents’ valuations and re-
turns (1) a trading-price p, (2) for each buyer(seller) i, the amount of units ti he
should buy(sell) at price p, and possibly a trading-fee fi paid to the market-maker.
A mechanism is materially-balanced if the number of units bought equals the number
of units sold:
∑
i∈Buyers ti =
∑
j∈Sellers tj . It is budget-balanced (BB) if it is materially-
balanced and
∑
i∈Traders fi ≥ 0. It is strongly-budget-balanced (SBB) if
∑
i∈Traders fi =
0.
A mechanism is individually-rational (IR) if every agent i has a weakly-positive
gain: Gaini(ti, p) − fi ≥ 0 with probability 1. It is DSIC (= truthful) if an agent can
never increase his gain by pretending to have different valuations.
The demand of buyer i is the number of units that maximizes the gain:Demandi(p) =
argmaxt∈{0,...,M}Gaini(t, p). The genericity assumption implies that the maximum
is unique. When i has DMR, Demandi(p) equals the number of virtual-buyers i, t
with vi,t > p. 2
2 This is true only for a DMR agent. For example, suppose buyer i values one unit as 3 and two units as 4.
Then vi,1 = 3 and vi,2 = 1. If the price is 2, then there is one virtual buyer with value above the price, and
indeed the agent’s demand is 1. However, if the buyer values one unit as 1 and two units as 4, then vi,1 = 1
and vi,2 = 3. If the price is 2, then there is still one virtual buyer with value above the price, but the agent’s
demand is 0.
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The aggregate-demand at price p is the sum of demands of all buyers. Equivalently,
this is the number of virtual-buyers with vj,t > p. The supply and aggregate-supply are
defined analogously.
The total-gain-from-trade is the sum of gains of all buyers and sellers: total GFT :=∑
i∈Traders Gaini(ti). Note that in a materially-balanced mechanism, the total-GFT
does not depend on the trading-price. The agents-GFT is the total GFT minus the total
fees, agents GFT := total GFT −∑i∈Traders fi.
3 Mechanism Details
This section explains the details of the MUDA mechanism presented in the introduc-
tion. The steps are done in each sub-market separately. For convenience we describe
step 1 in the right market and step 2 in the left market; the execution in the opposite
direction is entirely analogous.
Step 1: Price calculation. We calculate a price that is an equilibrium price at the
right market — a price pR for which DemandR(pR) = SupplyR(pR). Such a price
exists even in more general (multi-good) settings. It can be found, for example, by
simulating an English auction (Gul and Stacchetti, 2000), or by binary search.
Step 2: Posted-price trade. For each buyer i in the left market, calculateDemandi(pR).
For each seller j in the left market, calculate Supplyj(pR). Let DemandL be the sum
of demands and SupplyL the sum of supplies. If DemandL = SupplyL, then we
can let the traders trade freely at price pR and the market will clear. Usually, however,
we will not be so lucky: there will be either excess demand (DemandL > SupplyL)
or excess supply (DemandL < SupplyL). These two cases are handled analogously;
henceforth we describe how to handle excess supply. First, we ask each buyer to pay
in advance for the optimal number of units he wants to buy at price pR, so we have
money for DemandL units. Since DemandL < SupplyL, we will have more than
enough units to give to all these buyers for their money. The problem is how to select
the sellers that will supply these DemandL units. We present two solutions.
(a) Lottery: Order the sellers randomly; let each seller in turn sell at price pR as
many units as he likes, while there is money (i.e, while at most DemandL units are
sold).
(b) Vickrey-style auction: Order the virtual sellers in increasing order of their value.
From the SupplyL virtual sellers whose value is below pR, pick theDemandL virtual-
sellers with the lowest values, and have each of them sell an item at price pR.
The Vickrey-style auction is followed by a 4th step: trading-fees. For each seller j,
let kj be the number of virtual-sellers of this seller that are picked. Note that kj ≤
Supplyj(p
R). The fee paid by seller j is determined by the potential gains of the
virtual-sellers that are “pushed” out of the market because of seller j. Specifically,
consider the set of virtual-sellers who want to trade in the left-market, except the kj
virtual-sellers of j. From this set, pick the (at most) DemandL low-value ones. In this
set, there are (at most) kj virtual-sellers that do not trade when seller j is present. Seller
j pays to the market-maker, the gain (price minus value) of these virtual sellers. Note
that the trading-fee is positive if kj > 0 and zero if kj = 0.
Example 1. Suppose pR = 50. The virtual-buyers in the left market have values
100, 90, 80, 60, 40, 20, so the aggregate demand is 4. There are two sellers: Alice’s
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values are 10, 20, 40, 60, 70 and Bob’s values are 15, 25, 35, 45, 65, so the aggregate
supply is 7 and there is excess supply. The four high-value virtual-buyers (with values
100,90,80,60) each pays 50 and is guaranteed a unit.
In Lottery-MUDA, the two sellers are ordered randomly; if Alice is first then she
sells 3 units and gains 40+30+10 = 80, and Bob sells 1 unit and gains 35, so the GFT
is 115. If Bob is first then he sells 4 units and gains 35 + 25 + 15 + 5 = 80, and Alice
sells nothing. The price is 50 per unit, all money collected from the buyers is given to
the sellers, and no money is given to the market-maker.
In Vickrey-MUDA, the four low-value virtual-sellers are picked: they are the virtual-
sellers with values 10,15,20,25. So each each real seller sells two units for 50 per
unit. At this point Alice’s gain is (50 − 10) + (50 − 20) = 70 and Bob’s gain is
(50−15)+(50−25) = 60, so the total-GFT is 130. Now, Alice pays a fee of 20, since
her presence prevents Bob from selling two units worth for him 35 and 45, so her net
gain is 50. Bob pays 10, since his presence prevents Alice from selling a unit worth for
her 40 (the unit worth 60 would not have been sold anyway), so his net gain is 50 too,
and the agents-GFT is 100. The market-maker gains 30.
4 Strategic Properties of MUDA
In both variants of MUDA, the traders cannot affect their trading-price. Moreover, in
both variants, the traders in the short side of each sub-market trade the amount of units
that maximizes their gain given the price, so for them the mechanism is obviously IR
and DSIC. As for the long-side traders:
(a) in Lottery-MUDA they play random serial dictatorship: the first agents in the
line trade their optimal quantity given the price and the last agents in the line cannot
trade at all. There is at most a single agent, in the middle of the line, who trades less
than his optimal quantity. Because of the DMR assumption, it is always optimal to
trade as many units as possible up to the optimal quantity (since the highest gain comes
from trading the first units). Therefore, the mechanism is IR and DSIC for all traders.
(b) In Vickrey-MUDA, long-side virtual-traders trade only if they have positive
gain. In this case, a trader with kj participating virtual-traders pays a fee that is equal
to the gain of at most kj non-participating virtual-traders. Since the mechanism always
selects the virtual-traders with the highest gain, the total fee paid by any trader is lower
than his gain, so the net gain remains positive and the mechanism is IR. The mechanism
is DSIC since it is effectively a multi-unit Vickrey-auction with a reserve-price. It is
known that such a mechanism is DSIC; we omit the proof.
5 Competitive-Ratio Analysis
In this section we prove Theorem 3. In fact, we prove a more general claim that depends
on a third parameter, m — the minimum number of units offered(demanded) by a
single seller(buyer) at same value. We assume that the virtual-traders of each trader i
are divided to groups of size at leastm, such that the values in each group are the same.
So each agent i values mi,1 units as vi,1, mi,2 units as vi,2, etc., with mi,l ≥ m for all
l and
∑
lmi,l ≤ M . Theorem 3 follows from the expression at the end of this section
by setting m = 1.
We first analyze the optimal trade, then the right sub-market and finally the left
sub-market.
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5.1 Optimal trade
In the optimal trade, there is a set B∗ of virtual-buyers who buy goods from a set S∗
of virtual-sellers. By material-balance the numbers of virtual-agents in both groups are
the same; this is the number we denoted by k:
|B∗| = |S∗| = k (1)
We call these k buyers and sellers the efficient traders. We make the pessimistic as-
sumption that all GFT in the sub-markets comes from these efficient traders. There-
fore, the GFT of our mechanism depends on the numbers of efficient traders that trade
in each sub-market.
The reduction in GFT has two reasons: one is the sampling error — efficient buyers
and sellers land in different sub-markets, so they do not meet and cannot trade. This
error is easy to bound using standard tail bounds. The second reason is the pricing
error — the price at the sub-market might be too high or too low, which might create
imbalance in the demand and supply. Analyzing this error requires careful analysis of
the equilibrium in the optimal situation vs. the equilibrium in each sub-market.
5.2 Right sub-market
In the right sub-market, MUDA calculates an equilibrium price pR. We define four sets
of virtual-traders:
• B− is the set of efficient virtual-buyers (members of B∗) whose value is below
pR (so they won’t buy at price pR).
• S− is the set of efficient virtual-sellers (members of S∗) whose value is above
pR (so they won’t sell at price pR).
• B+ is the set of inefficient virtual-buyers whose value is above pR (so they want
to buy at price pR).
• S+ is the set of inefficient virtual-sellers whose value is below pR (so they want
to sell at price pR).
These sets represent the pricing error, so we want to upper-bound their sizes.
For any set T of agents, denote by TR the subset of T that is sampled to the right
market and by TL the subset of T sampled to the left market. By definition of the
equilibrium price pR:
|BR∗ | − |BR−|+ |BR+ | = |SR∗ | − |SR− |+ |SR+ | (2)
In order to relate (1) and (2), we have to relateBR∗ , S
R
∗ toB∗, S∗. This is be done using
the following lemma.
Lemma. For every set T of virtual-traders and for every integer q > 0:
w.p. 1− 2 exp
(−2mq2
M2|T |
)
:
∣∣∣∣|TR| − |T |2
∣∣∣∣ < q (3)
(“w.p. x” is a shorthand to “with probability at least x”).
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Figure 1: Price-distortion due to sampling. Each ball is the value of a single-unit buyer
and each square is the value of a single-unit seller. Left: the optimal situation where
there are 5 deals: the buyers above the line pO trade with the sellers below the line.
Right: the right market: full markers represent the traders sampled to the right and
empty markers represent the traders sampled to the left. The equilibrium price pR is
higher than pO, so some efficient buyers quit (B−) and some inefficient sellers join
(S+).
The lemma is proved using Hoeffding’s inequality. The proof is standard and we
omit it.
We apply this lemma twice, to B∗ and S∗, and combine the outcomes using the
union bound. This gives, ∀q > 0:
w.p.1− 4e−2mq
2
M2k :
∣∣∣∣|BR∗ | − k2
∣∣∣∣ < q and ∣∣∣∣|SR∗ | − k2
∣∣∣∣ < q (4)
Combining equations 1,2,4 gives, ∀q > 0:
w.p.1− 4e−2mq
2
M2k :
∣∣|BR− ∪ SR+ | − |BR+ ∪ SR− |∣∣ < 2q (5)
Of the two sets in the left-hand side, at least one must be empty: if pR is too high
(relative to some optimal equilibrium price pO) then efficient buyers quit and inefficient
sellers join, but no inefficient buyers join and no efficient sellers quit, soBR+ = S
R
− = ∅.
This situation is illustrated in Figure 1. Analogously, if pR is too low thenBR− = S
R
+ =
∅.
From now on we assume that the situation is like in Figure 1 (the other situation is
analogous). So (5) implies:
∀q : w.p.1− 4e−2mq
2
M2k : |BR−| < 2q and |SR+ | < 2q (6)
Our goal is now to derive an upper bound on B− and S+. They are entirely analogous;
we focus on B−. Note that we cannot apply (3) directly to B−, since B− is a random-
set — it depends on the random-sampling through pR. (3) does not apply to sets T that
depend on the random-sampling; as an illustration, suppose the set T is selected such
that it contains only virtual-agents from the right market. Then TR = T so (3) is ob-
viously not satisfied. Fortunately, B− is a special random-set — it is one-dimensional:
for every integer t > 0, it has only a single possible value with cardinality t, which
is the set of t virtual-buyers with the lowest value in B∗ (see Figure 1, where t = 1).
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Denote these sets by B−,t. For every t, B−,t is independent of the random-sampling,
so it is eligible to (3). Substituting there q → 2t− 2q gives:
∀q, t : w.p.1− 2e−2m(2t−2q)
2
M2·4t :
∣∣|BR−,4t| − 2t∣∣ < 2t− 2q (7)
=⇒ |BR−,4t| > 2q
If |BR−| < 2q and |BR−,4t| > 2q, then necessarily |B−| < 4t. So by combining (6) and
(7) with the union bound we get, ∀q, t:
w.p.1− 4e−2m(t−q)
2
M2t − 4e−2mq
2
M2k : |B−| < 4t & |S+| < 4t (8)
To simplify the expression we choose t = 2q; assuming 2q < k, this implies −2m(t−q)
2
M2t <
−2mq2
M2k , so (8) simplifies to:
∀q < k/2 : w.p.1− 8e−2mq
2
M2k : |B−| < 8q & |S+| < 8q (9)
5.3 Left sub-market
Denote by BL(SL) the set of efficient buyers(sellers) who want to buy(sell) in the left
sub-market at price pR:
BL := BL∗ \BL− = B∗ \BR∗ \BL−
SL := SL∗ \ SL− = SL∗ = S∗ \ SR∗
(Recall that we assume the case in which S− and B+ are empty; the other case is
analogous).
Using (4) and (9) with the same q gives, for every q < k2 :
w.p. 1− 8e−2mq
2
M2k : |BL| > k
2
− 9q and |SL| > k
2
− q
In Vickrey-MUDA, the most efficient traders in each side trade with each other. There-
fore, the mechanism makes at least the k2 − 9q most efficient deals in the left submar-
ket. Similar considerations are true in the right submarket. All in all, Vickrey-MUDA
does at least the k − 18q most efficient out of the k efficient deals. Therefore, w.p.
1− 8e−2mq
2
M2k , the competitive ratio is at least 1− 18 qk .
In Lottery-MUDA, the efficient sellers in SL∗ have to compete with the inefficient
sellers in SL+ in the random lottery. The expected number of efficient deals carried out
is thus:
|BL|
|SL+|+ |SL∗ |
≥ k/2− 9q
k/2 + 9q
≥ k
2
− 18q
Therefore, w.p. 1−8e−2mq
2
M2k , the expected competitive ratio is at least 1−36 qk . So w.p.
1, the expected competitive ratio is at least 1− 8e−2mq
2
M2k − 36 qk .
All our analysis so far holds simultaneously for every q < k2 . Now, we select q to
maximize the expected competitive ratio. With some tedious calculations we find that,
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when k is sufficiently large, we can select q such that the competitive ratio is at least:
3
1− 36M
2
√
mk
(
1 +
√
ln
(
162mk
362M2
))
=1−O
(
M
√
lnmk
mk
)
The analysis for Vickrey-MUDA is obtained by replacing 36 with 18; the asymptotic
behavior is the same.
6 Simulations
To complement our theoretic analysis, we simulated MUDA on traders with valuations
sampled both from a synthetic distribution and an empirical distribution based on real
stock-exchange data.
6.1 Uniform distribution
In the first experiment, for each agent, we sampled M/m values from a uniform dis-
tribution with support [V − A, V + A]. We considered each of these values as the
marginal-value of m virtual-traders, so that each agent has M virtual-traders. We or-
dered the values in decreasing order to get DMR valuations. In the experiments, we
took m = 100 and V = 500 and varied the noise-amplitude A between 50 and 450.
Here we show the results for A = 250; varying A did not have much effect on the
results. We repeated each experiment 100 times and averaged the results.
3 Define x = q
k
. We look for an x that minimizes 8e
−2mx2k
M2 + 36x. The first-order condition is:
36M2
32mk
= x · exp
(−2mkx2
M2
)
The solution is:
xmin =
√
−M2
4mk
·W
(−362M2
162mk
)
When k is sufficiently large, the argument of W is small and it is approximated by:
W (z) ≈ − ln( 1−x )− ln(ln(
1
−x )) ≈ − ln(
1
−x )
so:
xmin ≈
√
M2
4mk
· ln
(
162mk
362M2
)
Substituting q = kxmin gives:
36
q
k
=
36M
2
√
mk
√
ln
(
162mk
362M2
)
8e
−2mq2
M2k = 8
(
162mk
362M2
)−1/2
=
36M
2
√
mk
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Figure 2: Competitive ratio of MUDA when traders’ valuations are drawn from a
uniform distribution. Legend:
* Downward-wedges = agents-GFT of Vickrey-MUDA;
* Discs = Lottery-MUDA;
* Upward-wedges = total-GFT of Vickrey-MUDA.
Left: maximum number of units per trader (M ) is fixed, and number of traders (and
total number of units) increases.
* Agents-GFT of Vickrey-MUDA ranges from 0.58 to 0.86.
* GFT of Lottery-MUDA ranges from 0.74 to 0.92.
* Total-GFT of Vickrey-MUDA ranges from 0.897 to 0.991.
Right: total number of units is fixed, and maximum number of units per trader increases
(so the total number of traders decreases).
In the first sub-experiment, we kept M constant (at 100, 000) and varied the num-
ber of real traders between 0 and 1000. The results are shown in Figure 2/Left. The
competitive ratios of all variants of MUDA increase towards 1 when the number of
traders grows.
In the second sub-experiment, we kept constant the total number of units held by
all sellers. We increased M from 100 to 108, and decreased the number of traders
accordingly so that the total number of units remains constant. The results are shown
in Figure 2/Right. The competitive ratios decrease when M increases and the same
number of units are concentrated in the hand of fewer traders. WhenM is very large we
effectively have one buyer and one seller, and then the impossibility result of (Myerson
and Satterthwaite, 1983) implies that no positive competitive ratio is possible.
Both plots show that the GFT of Lottery-MUDA is approximately middle-way be-
tween the total-GFT and the agents-GFT of Vickrey-MUDA. This fact has a practical
implication regarding the choice of mechanism: if the market is managed by a mo-
nopolist (e.g. the government), then Vickrey-MUDA is better since its total-GFT is
higher; but if the market competes with other markets (e.g. stock trading platforms),
then Lottery-MUDA is better since its agents-GFT is higher.
We found that, when the number of units per trader is fixed, the performance is
determined by the number of traders in the market. Therefore, the plot at the left of
Figure 2 remains the same even when we set e.g. m = 1 and M = 10. As for the plot
at the right of Figure 2, if we set the total number of units to e.g. 1000, then the plot
approaches zero already when M = 1e3, since in this case there is a single buyer and
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Figure 3: Competitive ratio of MUDA when traders’ valuations are drawn
from an empirical distribution based on NYSE orders. Discs = Lottery-MUDA;
upward/downward-wedges = total/agents-GFT of Vickrey-MUDA. At the left, each
order is assumed to belong to a different trader (so all traders are additive). At the
right, orders from the same order-date are merged to a single trader.
a single seller.
6.2 Empirical stock-exchange distribution
In the second experiment, we used the TORQ database (Hasbrouck, 1992; Lee and
Radhakrishna, 2000). It contains buy and sell orders given for a sample of 144 NYSE
stocks for the three months 1990-11 through 1991-01. In the NYSE, each day before
the continuous trade begins, there is a phase of “start-of-day auctions”. For each stock,
a separate multi-unit double-auction is conducted in the following way. All buy and sell
orders given for that stock before the start of day are collected. An equilibrium price
is calculated. All buy-orders above the price and all sell-orders below the price are
executed. As explained in the introduction, this mechanism is efficient but not truthful.
Therefore, the orders may not represent the true values of the traders. While there are
econometric methods for estimating the true values from the reported values, these are
beyond the scope of the present paper, since we do not need to know the true value of
every trader — all we need is a distribution of values. Our results are valid as long as
the empirical distribution of reported values resembles the distribution of values in the
real world.
In the present paper we assume that the empirical distribution of the orders is simi-
lar to the empirical distribution of the true values.
For the experiment, we considered only the start-of-day orders. These orders are
given in the format (Symbol, Date, Order date, Side, Price, Quantity) where
• Symbol is the three-letter acronym of the stock;
• Date is the day of the auction.
• Order date is the day the order was made, which may be earlier than Date;
• Side is BUY or SELL; and
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• Price and Quantity are the actual bid.
The dataset contains 144 symbols, 7914 different symbol-date combinations and
≈ 210000 orders.
The dataset does not contain the identities of the traders. We made two experi-
ments: in the first we treated each order as a separate trader, so that all traders are
additive (each trader values a certain quantity of units for the same price-per-unit). In
the second experiment, we simulated traders with non-additive valuations by merging
bids based on the order-date. I.e, we heuristically assumed that two bids with the same
symbol, date, order-date and side belong to the same trader. We ordered the bids of the
same trader in descending order to create DMR valuations, similarly to the uniform
experiment. In average, each merged bidder contained 10 different orders. The number
of units per order ranges between 100 and 99000, so m = 100. The number of units
per trader, after combining orders from the same order-date, ranges between 5000 and
12000000 with median 148000, so M = 12000000.
For each symbol, we created a collection of all traders in all days to represent the
empirical distribution of this symbol. Then, in each experiment we sampled n traders,
where n = 10, 20, . . . , 990. All in all we simulated 99 · 144 auctions and averaged the
144 auctions for each n. The results are shown in Figure 3.
6.3 Discussion
It is interesting that the plots in Figure 3 look almost the same, i.e, the non-additivity
had little effect on the results. The reason might be that stock-traders have many differ-
ent bids with very similar prices, so that they are almost additive.
The competitive ratio in the TORQ experiment is somewhat lower than in the uni-
form case. We attribute this to the large variation in the number of units: while some
traders hold only 5000 units, others hold as many as 12 million.
The source code used for the experiments is available at the following URL:
https://github.com/erelsgl/economics
7 Future Work
It is interesting whether MUDA can be extended to agents with general valuations (not
DMR). This poses two challenges. First, in step 1, a price-equilibrium might not exist
(the existence of a price-equilibrium is guaranteed only when the agents have DMR).
Second, in step 2, material balance might fail. For example, if there is one buyer who
only wants to buy 2 units and one seller who only wants to sell 3 units, then with DMR
we can assume that both agree to trade 2 units, but without DMR this assumption might
be false — the seller might have negative utility from selling 3 units.
Another challenge is handling double auctions with multiple types of items. Pre-
liminary results in this direction were presented by Segal-Halevi et al. (2016a).
We will also be happy to compare MUDA to other double-auction mechanisms.
In particular, an interesting practical question is when would MUDA’s truthfulness ac-
tually matter — how does its GFT compare to the GFT in Nash equilibrium of the
standard (non-truthful) market mechanism? As far as we know, the Nash-equilibrium
GFT of the non-truthful market mechanism (i.e, its “price-of-anarchy”) is still an open
question. The closest reference we found is by Babaioff et al. (2014), who consider the
price-of-anarchy of the market mechanism in a single-sided market. We are not aware
of analogous results for double-sided markets.
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But non-truthful market mechanisms have disadvantages beyond the price-of-anarchy.
First, the players need to spend resources to obtain information about other players and
calculate their best response. Second, the players may not even play an equilibrium.
It is possible that players do not know the correct state of the market and hence play
best-response to a fictitious state. This can bring social welfare to zero. Consider any
mechanism that sets a single price clearing the market. For every active buyer(seller),
it is a best response to bid below(above) the market price in order to push the price
down(up). If all agents play these best responses, the outcome is that nothing gets sold.
Such market failures are prevented by the truthfulness of MUDA.
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